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531 
THE “LEGAL STRANGER” AND PARENT:  




Dealing with a divorce or legal separation is overwhelming for 
all couples.1  Married same-sex couples who walk the same path, 
however, find an incredibly different road ahead of them, especially 
when it comes to issues of custody and visitation.2  These matters are 
further complicated if there is only one legal or biological parent.3 
Traditionally, a “parent” is defined as “an individual who is the 
biological parent, stepparent or adoptive parent of a child whose 
guardianship and custody or care and custody have been transferred by 
the parent to an authorized agency . . . .”4  However, most jurisdictions, 
including New York, have moved away from this strict interpretation 
of what a parent is.5  Many States have adopted the definition provided 
by the American Law Institute (ALI)6 and expanded their idea of a 
 
*Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D., 2018; Stony Brook, B.A., in Political 
Science, 2015.  I would like to thank the other two thirds of the musketeers and my teammate 
– endless thanks and love for the support, encouragement and patience throughout this process.  
Finally, I would like to give a special thank you to Dean Myra Berman, my faculty advisor, 
for always being there with words of encouragement, and to my editor, Rhona Amorado, for 
her assistance and advice.  
1  Diane Neumann, The Psychological Stages of Divorce, DIANE NEUMANN & ASSOCIATES, 
(2011), http://www.divorcemed.com/Articles/ArticlesByDiane/The%20Psychological%20 St 
ages%20of%20Divorce.htm.  
2 Julie Compton, For Some Same-Sex Couples, Divorce is a Legal Nightmare, NBC NEWS, 
(Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/some-same-sex-couples-divorce-
legal-nightmare-n643891.  
3 Id. 
4 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18 § 422.1 (2015).  
5 Joel Stashenko, Ruling Expands NY Definition of Parenthood, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, 
Aug. 30, 2016. 
6 The American Law Institute is the leading independent organization in the country 
producing work “to clarify, modernize, and improve the law.” THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 
ABOUT ALI, https://www.ali.org/about-ali/ (2017).  ALI is responsible for drafting, revising 
1
Mahoney: The “Legal Stranger” and Parent
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018
532 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 34 
parent to include the concepts of psychological parent, de facto parent 
and parent by estoppel.7   
To establish a psychological parent, the party seeking custody 
or visitation must meet three general requirements.8   The party: (i) 
cannot be the legal parent; (ii) must have resided with the child for a 
significant period of time; and (iii) must have performed a certain level 
of caretaking functions.9  ALI defines a de facto parent as a party, other 
than a legal or biological parent who lived with the child for a requisite 
period of time and, with the consent, of the legal parent, forms a parent-
child relationship, or regularly performed a certain share of caretaking 
duties without any compensation or expectation thereof.10  A parent by 
estoppel is defined as an individual who is either obligated to pay child 
support or lived with the subject child for a certain period of time and 
made good-faith efforts to accept responsibilities of child care, or lived 
with the child since birth and accepted responsibility for the child.11  
While some of these definitions are recognized in New York, they have 
not been held to apply to same-sex couples when determining custody 
and visitation during a divorce.12  
In 1991, the Court of Appeals in the state of New York decided, 
in Alison D. v. Virginia M.,13 that the notion of parents were a man and 
a woman;14 same-sex couples did not fall into this category.15  As a 
result of Alison D., the non-biological or non-adoptive partner in a 
same-sex couple was not granted the same rights as a biological or 
legal parent when seeking custody and/or visitation.16  After more than 
twenty years, the Court of Appeals decided, in In the Matter of Brooke 
 
and publishing Restatements of the Law, Model Codes, and Principles of Law that are 
foundational in both courts and legislatures, as well as being crucial to legal education. 
7 Id. 
8 JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF 
THE CHILD 18, (The Free Press, 2nd ed. 1979); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE 
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 18 (American Law 
Institute, 1st softcover ed. 2003).   
9 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 18.   
10 Id. 
11 Id.  
12 See discussion infra Sections IV, V and VI.  
13 572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991).  
14 Stashenko, supra note 5. 
15 Alison D., 572 N.E.2d 27.  This changed when the highest court in New York decided 
Brooke. In the Matter of Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 490 (N.Y. 2016). 
16 Alison D., 572 N.E.2d 27. 
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S.B. v. Elizabeth A. C. C.,17 that Alison D. no longer applied.18  In 
August 2016, the Court of Appeals held “that where a partner shows 
by clear and convincing evidence that the parties agreed to conceive a 
child and to raise the child together, the non-biological, non-adoptive 
partner has standing to seek visitation and custody under Domestic 
Relations Law (DRL) § 70.”19  While this may be a step in the right 
direction, there are still certain limitations placed upon who has 
standing to seek custody or visitation.20  Under Brooke, a couple must 
have a preconception agreement in order for the non-biological, non-
legal parent to have standing to seek custody or visitation.21  As such, 
there is still a large group of couples who will not meet this criteria.  
It is the argument of this Note that the definition of parent 
should be expanded beyond a legal or biological parent, requiring the 
State to also recognize the type of parentage illustrated by the ALI 
principles, namely, psychological parent, de facto parent, and parent 
by estoppel.  Expanding the legal definition of a parent would allow 
formerly married same-sex partners to establish standing to seek 
custody and visitation in the State of New York.   
This Note will be divided into four sections.  Section II will 
look at the New York Court of Appeals and its decisions regarding the 
status of homosexuals and the protections, or lack thereof, afforded to 
them and their families by the Court.  Specifically, it will discuss the 
Court’s strict interpretation of the DRL in Alison D., the context that 
gave rise to that decision, and how courts handled Alison D. going 
forward.  Section III will discuss the evolution of the definition of 
marriage ranging from the Defense of Marriage Act to two Supreme 
Court cases, the most recent of which was Obergefell v. Hodges,22 
decided in 2015.  Section IV will discuss, in detail, the three concepts 
of parent followed by the ALI.  Specifically, this section will discuss 
the concept of the psychological parent, de facto parent, and parent by 
 
17 Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d 490. 
18 Id.   
19 Id. (citing to N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §70 (McKinney 2018)). 
20 See generally Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d 490.  
21 Id.  
22 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).  This case will be discussed at length 
in Section III as it is the beginning of same-sex relationship recognition throughout the legal 
system.  As this Note is discussing married same-sex partners, a discussion of Obergefell is 
necessary to give a complete picture of same-sex couples in the legal system.  
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estoppel, its application in other jurisdictions,23 and how New York 
courts have handled these concepts as it applies to same sex couples.  
Furthermore, this section explains the concept of a parent by estoppel 
in relation to the New York Court of Appeals 2016 landmark decision, 
Brooke, which overruled Alison D.  Section V will make the argument 
as to how New York should move forward in light of the decision in 
Brooke, as well as the concepts discussed in the previous sections.  
Finally, section VI will put forth the proposition that New York should 
extend the definition of parent to include the principles set forth above. 
II. ALISON D. V. VIRGINIA M. AND HER LEGACY 
Alison D. v. Virginia M. did not arise out of a vacuum, but 
followed a line of cases from the New York Court of Appeals that 
limited or refused to acknowledge same-sex couples and their 
freedoms.24  The two major cases, People v. Onofre25 and In re 
Adoption of Robert Paul P.,26 show the beginnings of those limitations 
and how the Court reached its decision in Alison D.  
A. Alison D.’s Predecessors  
In 1980, the Court of Appeals decided People v. Onofre.27  
Defendant Onofre was convicted by the trial court of violating § 
130.38 of the Penal Law “after his admission to having committed acts 
of deviate sexual intercourse with a 17-year-old male at [his] home.”28  
The Court held New York’s sodomy laws were unconstitutional 
because it distinguished between married and unmarried persons as 
well as heterosexual and homosexual conduct.29  The Court found that 
such classifications were unconstitutional under the Equal Protection 
 
23 In showcasing what this could look like, this Note will focus its examples solely on those 
in the Northeastern states. 
24 See generally In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 63 N.Y.2d 233, 235 (N.Y. 1984), People 
v. Onofre 51 N.Y.2d 476, 483 (N.Y. 1980). 
25 Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476.  
26 Adoption of Robert, 63 N.Y.2d 233; see also Joseph G. Arsenault, Comment: “Family” 
but Not “Parent”: The Same-Sex Coupling Jurisprudence of the New York Court of Appeals, 
58 ALB. L. REV. 813, 829 (1995).  
27 Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476.  
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
4
Touro Law Review, Vol. 34 [2018], No. 2, Art. 13
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss2/13
2018 THE “LEGAL STRANGER” AND PARENT 535 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the right of privacy granted 
by the Constitution.30   
In an attempt to gain further protection under the laws of the 
United States, unmarried same-sex couples tried to find a foothold to 
legitimize their relationships.31  In the case of In re Adoption of Robert 
Paul P., a man tried to adopt his partner for financial, economic, and 
emotional reasons.32  The Court found this invalid, but in hearing the 
case, recognized the need for same-sex partners to have security and 
stability in their personal affairs.33  Nevertheless, the Court again 
refused to extend to same-sex partners the same rights and protections 
of the law granted to heterosexual couples.34  This case was known as 
a critical low-point for homosexual couples.35   
While these cases did not make great strides for same-sex 
couples and the homosexual community, it opened the Court’s eyes to 
the fact that there is a whole other group of people, with lives and 
homes, and joint bank accounts that were looking for protection and 
legitimacy under the law.36  Despite the increased visibility within the 
court system of same-sex couples and the larger homosexual 
community, the courts continued to struggle with providing that 
community with the protections and legitimacy under the law that they 
were seeking.37  Although Alison D. continued the trend of the courts 
in failing to legitimize homosexual couples and their families, it was 
unique in that its dissent focused on the children who were affected the 
most by the courts refusal to recognize their families.38 
B. Alison D. v. Virginia M.   
Petitioner Alison and respondent Virginia, a homosexual 
couple, had been in a relationship since September 1977.39  In March 
of 1980, after living together for two years, the couple decided to have 
 
30 Id. 
31 Arsenault, supra note 26, at 813. 
32 Id. at 829. 
33 Id.  
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 813. 
36 Arsenault, supra note 26, at 813. 
37 Id.  
38 Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 30. 
39 Id. 
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a baby.40  In November of 1983, when the child was a little over two 
years, the couple ended their relationship.41  Virginia, who was the 
child’s biological parent, maintained custody of the child.42  Petitioner 
Alison commenced the suit seeking visitation rights after Virginia 
“terminated all contact between petitioner and the child, returning all 
of petitioner’s gifts and letters.”43    
The Court, at the outset, refused to recognize Alison as a 
parent;44 Alison was described as “a biological stranger.”45  The Court 
of Appeals held that Alison had no standing to seek visitation rights 
because she was neither the biological nor the adoptive parent of the 
child.46  The Court recognized that “although petitioner apparently 
nurtured a close and loving relationship with the child, she [was] not a 
parent within the meaning of Domestic Relations Law § 70.”47   
The Court disregarded Alison’s plea for a finding that she was 
“a ‘de facto’ parent or that she should be viewed as a parent ‘by 
estoppel.’”48  Rather than balancing her claim with that of the 
biological mother’s claim, the Court found that one cannot coexist with 
the other.49  The Court wrote that to award visitation, or even standing 
to petition for visitation, would “impair the parents’ right to custody 
and control.”50  With the Court again citing to the DRL, it found that 
standing is granted only to explicit categories of persons seeking 
visitation, namely parents and grandparents.51  The Court reasoned 
 
40 Id.   
41 Id. 
42 Id.   
43 Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 28.  
44 Id. at 29.  The Court refused to recognize Alison, even though she was the caretaker of 
the child. Id. 
45 Id. at 28.  
46 Id. at 29.  
47 Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 28.  
48 Id. at 29.  
49 Id. 
50 Id.  
51 Id.  DOM. REL. LAW § 70 states that “either parent may apply to the supreme court for a 
writ of habeas corpus to have such minor child brought before such court; and on the return 
thereof, the court, on due consideration, may award the natural guardianship, charge and 
custody of such child to either parent. . . .”  DOM. REL. LAW § 72 provides that: 
where circumstances show that conditions exist which equity would see 
fit to intervene, a grandparent of the grandparents of such child may apply 
to the supreme court by commencing a special proceeding or for a writ of 
habeas corpus to have such child brought before such court . . . and on the 
return thereof, the court, by order, after due notice to the parent or any 
other person or party having the care, custody and control of such child, 
6
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that, because “parent” is not defined, but grandparents are explicitly 
granted standing, Alison, in a strictly biological sense, is not a parent 
under the DRL.52   
In deciding not to interpret DRL § 70 in a broader fashion, the 
Court perpetuated the idea that not all parents will be considered as 
such under the law.53  Understanding the ramifications of refusing to 
acknowledge other forms of parents, the Court had received multiple 
amicus curiae briefs, ranging from the National Organization for 
Women to the Youth Law Center to several gay and lesbian parental 
couples.54  These amici believed that the case was centered on whether 
the Court was ready to reexamine a system which fixes marriage and 
biology as the end-all-be-all in determining who is a parent.55   
By interpreting DRL § 70 narrowly, the Court continued to 
pursue a strict definition of parent, with serious consequences for 
parents in a same-sex union.56  Further, in fixing the biological 
connection between a parent and child as the overriding claim to 
parenting, the law “discriminates against the non-biological parent in 
a same-sex couple because only one of the partners will ever have that 
biological link.”57  Not all justices subscribed to the majority view.58  
In her dissent from the majority, Justice Kaye acknowledged the 
ramifications of the Court’s decision.59 
C. Alison D.’s Dissent 
Dissenting from the majority, Justice Kaye wrote that the 
impact of the majority’s decision would have an effect on a “wide 
spectrum of relationships––including those of longtime heterosexual 
stepparents, ‘common-law’ and nonheterosexual partners. . . .”60  
Justice Kaye wrote “that as many as 8 to 10 million children who are 
 
to be given in such manner as the court shall prescribe, may make such 
directions as the best interest of the child may require, for visitation rights 
for such grandparent or grandparents in respect to such child. 
52 Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29.  
53 Arsenault, supra note 26, at 835.  
54 Id. at 834.  
55 Id. at 835.  
56 Id.  
57 Id.  
58 Arsenault, supra note 26, at 835. Justice Kaye was the only dissenting Justice. 
59 Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 30 (Kaye, J., dissenting). 
60 Id.  
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born into families with a gay or lesbian parent” would be affected, 
implicating how far this decision would reach.61  Highlighting the 
vulnerability of children and making it the focus of her dissent, Justice 
Kaye opined that the hardest hit would be those children who may be 
losing someone critical to their development and emotional stability.62  
Justice Kaye’s dissent would go on to be a highly cited dissent, and 
was cited in the very case the Court of Appeals heard to overturn Alison 
D.63  
D. Alison D.’s Aftermath  
In the jurisprudence following Alison D., the Court continued 
to struggle in recognizing the legitimacy of the family ties created by 
same-sex couples.64  The Court refused to allow nonbiological, 
nonlegal parents to have standing to seek custody and visitation of the 
children they had been raising with their same-sex partner.65 
1. In re Jacob 
In November 1995, four years after deciding Alison D., the 
Court of Appeals decided In re Jacob.66  In re Jacob was a 
consolidated case where single, unmarried adults––one homosexual 
and one heterosexual––were seeking second parent adoptions.67  In the 
first case, Matter of Jacob, the biological parents separated prior to the 
child’s birth and the mother was awarded sole custody.68  The 
biological mother’s boyfriend then sought to adopt the child, with the 
biological father’s consent.69  In Matter of Dana, the same-sex partner 
 
61 Id.  This language would later be quoted in Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d 490. 
62 Id.  
63 See, e.g., Debra H. v. Janice R., No. 106569/08, slip op. at 11-12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) 
citing cases that followed Justice Kaye’s dissent in Alison D., rev’d, 877 N.Y.S.2d 259 (App. 
Div. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010), abrogated by Brooke S.B., 
61 N.E.3d 490. 
64 Debra H., 930 N.E.2d 184; Matter of Shondel J. v. Mark D., 853 N.E.2d 610 (N.Y. 2006); 
In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1995). 
65 Id.  
66 Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 398.  
67 Id.  
68 Id.   
69 Id.   
8
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of the biological mother sought standing to adopt the biological 
mother’s child.70   
Writing for the majority and mirroring her dissent in Alison D., 
Chief Justice Kaye noted that the primary goal of the adoption statute 
at issue in Jacob was to protect the best interests of the child.71  The 
best interests of the child manifests itself as securing the best possible 
home, with “the emotional security of knowing that in the event of the 
biological parent’s death or disability, the other parent will have 
presumptive custody. . . .”72   
Expressly revisiting Alison D., the Court wrote that by 
permitting second parent adoptions, it would “achieve a measure of 
permanency with both parent figures and avoid[] the sort of disruptive 
visitation battle we faced in Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M.”73  
When specifically dealing with homosexual couples, the Court noted 
that New York does not prohibit a specific group from adopting based 
solely on their sexual orientation.74  In re Jacob, four years after Alison 
D., represents an important step forward in the courts’ decisions 
involving family. 
2. Matter of Shondel J. v. Mark D. 
In July 2006, the New York Court of Appeals decided Matter 
of Shondel J. v. Mark D.75  In January 1996, Shondel gave birth to a 
daughter, naming Mark as her biological father.76  Mark, in a sworn 
statement, accepted “all paternal responsibilities including child 
support.”77   
Mark had publicly and privately held himself out to be the 
child’s father.78  According to Shondel, Mark saw the child regularly, 
bought her toys, clothes, and other gifts, took the child to meet his 
parents, regularly spoke on the telephone with the child, and called 
himself “daddy” when talking to the child.79  Mark also signed a 
 
70 Id.  
71 Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 399.  
72 Id. 
73 Id.  
74 Id. at 401.  
75 Shondel J., 853 N.E.2d 610. 
76 Id. at 611.  
77 Id.  
78 Id.  
79 Id. at 610. 
9
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registry in Guyana stating that he was her father, authorized the change 
of her last name to his, and made the child the primary beneficiary on 
his life insurance policy.80  After several years of holding himself out 
to be the child’s father, Mark learned that he may not have been the 
child’s biological father, which prompted his filing of the case.81    
The lower courts required DNA testing to determine paternity 
because it was alleged that Mark was not the biological father of the 
child.82  The test proved that Mark was not the child’s biological father 
and Mark sought to severe his legal and financial obligations to the 
child.83  Despite the paternity test result, the Court held that “a man 
who has mistakenly represented himself as a child’s father may be 
estopped from denying paternity . . . when the child justifiably relied 
on the man’s representation of paternity, to the child’s detriment.”84   
Throughout the Court’s analysis, it continuously referred to the 
best interests of the child as being the primary interest of both the court 
and the legislature.85  Utilizing the concept of parent by estoppel, the 
Court of Appeals held that regardless of biological relation “Mark 
represented that he was the father of the child, and she justifiably relied 
on this representation, changing her position by forming a bond with 
him, to her ultimate detriment.”86  If the father was permitted to sever 
his ties with her, after she relied so heavily on his representations, the 
“cutting off of that support, whether emotional or financial, may leave 
the child in a worse position than if that support had never been 
given.”87  The Court found this would be too much of a burden to put 
on the innocent child, and found that Mark may not sever his ties and 
must continue to support the child.88  The resistance on the part of the 
Court to sever this tie, regardless of biological relations, offered a 
bright light to same-sex parents who do not have a biological 
relationship to their child.89 
 
80 Shondel J., 853 N.E.2d at 611.  
81 Id.  
82 Id.  
83 Id. at 612.  
84 Id. 
85 Shondel J., 853 N.E.2d at 612.   
86 Id. at 614.   
87 Id. at 615-16.  
88 Id. at 617.  
89 Id.  
10
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3. Debra H. v. Janice R. 
A few years later, in 2010, the Court was again asked to discuss 
Alison D. in Debra H. v. Janice R.90  In this case, Debra and Janice 
entered into a civil union in Vermont while Janice was pregnant.91  The 
Court, when asked to overrule or at least distinguish Alison D., refused 
to do so claiming that Alison D. provided a simple-to-understand test 
that allowed for efficiency and certainty.92  Regardless of the 
reaffirmation of Alison D., Debra was still permitted to seek visitation 
with the child.93  
In the interest of comity, the New York court looked to 
Vermont law to decide whether, in Vermont, Debra would have 
standing to seek custody.94  The Vermont law states that: Parties to a 
civil union shall have “all the same benefits, protections and 
responsibilities under law . . . as are granted to spouses in marriage” 
and that they shall enjoy the same rights “with respect to a child of 
whom either becomes the natural parent during the term of the civil 
union,” as “those of a married couple.”95  
Since Debra would have standing in Vermont to seek visitation 
and/or custody, and in the interest of comity, the Court held that she 
could seek it in New York as well.96   
In giving full faith and credit to the Vermont law, the New York 
Court moved farther from Alison D. and closer to allowing same-sex 
parents’ custody and visitation.97  As the States began dealing with the 
issue of non-biological, non-legal parentage, the Federal Government 
decided it needed to take steps to unify how the Courts would deal with 
the parent-child relationship.98    
III. DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT, WINDSOR, AND OBERGEFELL 
The Government passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 
in an attempt to take certain steps toward unifying Courts’ handling of 
 
90 Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 184. 
91 Id. at 186.  
92 Id. at 192. 
93 Id. at 196.  
94 Id. at 195.  
95 Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 195 (citation omitted).  
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id.  
11
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parentage.99  The passage of DOMA and two crucial subsequent 
Supreme Court cases, however, created more confusion in the area of 
same-sex parentage cases.100     
A. DOMA 
Prior to Debra, the federal government attempted to discard the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause101 by enacting DOMA in September of 
1996.102  The 104th Congress amended the United States Code by 
adding, after Section 1738B, that no State shall be required to afford 
full faith and credit to a marriage of a same-sex couple performed in 
another State.103  Section Three of DOMA, entitled Definition of 
Marriage, also amended the United States Code; this time amending 
Chapter 1 of title 1 to have a seventh section which stated: 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or 
of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various 
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United 
States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union 
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, 
and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the 
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.104 
It took years for these definitions to be successfully 
challenged.105  These added provisions signaled to same-sex couples 
that they would not be afforded standing to seek custody and/or 
visitation absent a biological relation to his or her child.106  There was 
 
99 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). 
100 Id., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013), Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2593.  
101 The Full Faith and Credit Clause addresses the duties that all States have to respect, and 
honor, the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State. U.S. CONST. art. 
IV § 1.  In the case of this Note, the Full Faith and Credit Clause is particularly important 
when dealing with legal marriages of same-sex couples in one state when there are children 
involved.  The Full Faith and Credit Clause was a round-about way for same-sex couples to 
be married in State A and have children and then if the couple decided to divorce in State B 
(where same-sex marriage was not permitted), State B would be forced to allow the non-
biological, non-adoptive parent to seek custody and/or visitation. Debra H., 930 N.E.2d 184.  
102 Defense of Marriage Act, 110 Stat. 2419. 
103 See Id. at §2(a). 
104 See id. at §3(a).   
105 Nina Totenberg, DOMA Challenge Tests Federal Definition of Marriage, NPR,               
(March 26, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/03/27/175295410/doma-challenge-tests-federal-
definition-of-marriage.  
106 Id.  
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no longer a “back door” into standing for custody and visitation, as full 
faith and credit was no longer given to same-sex unions performed in 
other States.107  A prime example of this refusal to recognize same-sex 
marriages is the 2013 Supreme Court case, United States v. Windsor.108   
B. United States v. Windsor 
Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer registered as domestic partners 
in 1993, thirty years after they began their relationship.109  When Spyer 
became sick, the couple made a trip to Ontario in 2007, and got 
married.110  Spyer died in 2009, and left the entirety of her estate to 
Windsor, who sought to qualify for the marital exemption from the 
federal estate tax.111  After being denied the exemption, Windsor 
commenced a refund suit in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York.112   
The Court held that DOMA, in injuring a specific class that 
New York law sought to protect, violated basic due process and equal 
protection principles that are applicable to the Federal Government.113  
The Act’s principal effect was to cherry-pick marriages and make them 
unequal; the principal purpose was to impose inequality.114  The Court, 
highlighting why domestic partnerships and civil unions were 
inadequate, stated that “responsibilities, as well as rights, enhance the 
dignity and integrity of the person.”115  By creating contradictory 
marriage schemes in which the marriages are recognized by New 
York, but not under federal law, DOMA forced the same-sex couples 
to live in a state of diminished stability and predictability of basic 
 
107 Id.  
108 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682.  
109 Id. at 2683.  
110 Id. 
111 Id.  The exemption excludes from taxation “any interest in property which passes or has 
passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse.” Id.  Windsor paid $363,053 in estate taxes, 
sought a refund and was denied that refund by the IRS. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.  
112 Id. at 2684.  While the refund suit was pending, the Attorney General notified the 
Speaker of the House that the Department of Justice would no longer defend the 
constitutionality of DOMA, “noting that the Department has previously defended DOMA 
against . . . challenges involving legally married same-sex couples.” Id. at 2683.  According 
to the A.G., “the President [had] concluded that given a number of factors, including a 
documented history of discrimination, classifications based on sexual orientation should be 
subject to a heightened level of scrutiny.” Id.  
113 Id. at 2694. 
114 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.  
115 Id. at 2694.   
13
Mahoney: The “Legal Stranger” and Parent
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018
544 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 34 
personal relations; thus, undermining the public and private 
significance of state-sanctioned same-sex marriages.116   
The Court further noted: 
[I]t (DOMA) tells those couples, and all the world, that 
their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of federal 
recognition.  This places same-sex couples in an 
unstable position of being in a second-tier marriage.  
The differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral 
and sexual choices the Constitution protects, and whose 
relationship the State has sought to dignify.  And it 
humiliates tens of thousands of children now being 
raised by same-sex couples.117 
The Court then described the harm DOMA was doing to the 
children of these same-sex marriages, including financial harm and 
impacting their benefits upon the loss of a parent.118  After deciding 
that the definition of spouse offered in DOMA was unconstitutional, 
the Court moved on to whether there was a fundamental right to marry 
for same-sex couples.119 
C. Obergefell v. Hodges 
In 2015, the Supreme Court again made history and declared 
that, indeed, same-sex couples had the same fundamental right to 
marry as opposite-sex couples.120  In the landmark case of Obergefell, 
 
116 Id.   
117 Id.  
118 Id. at 2695.  
119 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. 
120 Id. at 2599.  The Court discussed four principles and traditions that demonstrate the 
reasons why marriage is fundamental under the Constitution for same-sex couples as well as 
heterosexual couples. Id.  First, “the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in 
the concept of individual autonomy.” Id.  Second “the right to marry is fundamental because 
is supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed 
individuals.” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.  Thirdly, the right to marry “safeguards children 
and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and 
education.” Id. at 2600.  Finally, the majority stated that “this Court’s cases and the Nation’s 
traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of our social order.” Id. at 2601.  
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, while Obergefell has yet to be overturned, many 
States have not acted on the Court’s landmark decision.  Specifically, the very States involved 
in Obergefell (Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio and Tennessee) have yet to conform their State 
Constitutions to reflect that same-sex married couples are afforded the same rights and 
protections offered to heterosexual couples.  What seems to be the case, however, is that the 
14
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the petitioners were fourteen same-sex couples and two men whose 
partners were deceased.121  The couples were from four different states, 
all of which regulated marriage to be “a union between one man and 
one woman.”122   
Petitioners sought to be placed on an equal playing field with 
opposite-sex couples; they were seeking the rights and benefits 
afforded to heterosexual couples.123  These benefits included the 
protection of “child custody, support, and visitation rules.”124  Without 
the right to marry, these couples were not guaranteed such 
protection.125  The right to marry would also provide protection to 
“children and families, and thus, draws meaning from related rights of 
childbearing, procreation and education.”126  The right to marry would 
“allow[] children ‘to understand the integrity and closeness of their 
own family and its concord with other families in their community and 
daily lives.’”127  While keeping the best interest of the children at the 
forefront, the Court held that the institution of marriage grants the 
permanence and stability that is so vital to children.128 
Obergefell v. Hodges addressed the fundamental right of every 
individual, regardless of sexual orientation, to decide whom they love 
and want to marry.129  In so holding, the Court granted the legitimacy 
and recognition under the law that same-sex couples, and their 
families, had been seeking for decades.130  By granting this legitimacy, 
the Court was finally giving some protection to the children whom 
Justice Kaye expressed concern about decades ago in Alison D.131  
However, just because the marriages themselves were given 
legitimacy, it did not mean that such recognition would extend to the 
relationships that had not been solemnized by the government.132  
 
States are no longer enforcing the DOMA-like language contained in their Constitutions. See 
generally Arsenault, supra note 25.  
121 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593.  
122 Id.  The Court began with a history of marriage and its evolution over the course of the 
Nation’s history.  Id. at 2595-99.  
123 Id. at 2601. 
124 Id.  
125 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601. 
126 Id. at 2600.  
127 Id. (citation omitted).  
128 Id.  
129 Id. at 2602. 
130 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
131 Id. 
132 Totenberg, supra note 105.  
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Without the protections now afforded to same-sex married couples, 
unmarried couples are still left with relatively little protections when it 
comes to their families and seeking custody and visitation of their 
children.133    
IV. RECOGNIZING DIFFERENT KINDS OF PARENTS  
The Supreme Court decisions in Windsor and Obergefell 
granted recognition and provided protection to same-sex married 
couples.134  As States have tried to reconcile the new order of things 
after Obergefell; they have instituted numerous definitions and 
applications of the definition of a parent under the law.135  
A. The Psychological Parent 
The concept of a psychological parent “arose in the 1970’s 
during custody disputes between husband and wife, natural parents and 
foster parents, or unfit parents and grandparents.”136  Today, the 
psychological parent is one who, “on a continuing and regular basis, 
provides for a child’s emotional and physical needs.”137  In order to 
establish that an individual is a psychological parent, the party seeking 
custody or visitation must meet the following requirements: 
 (1) they must not be the child’s legal parent; (2) they 
must have, with the consent of the child’s legal parent, 
resided with the child within a significant period of 
time; (3) they must have routinely performed at least an 
equal share of the caretaking functions with the child’s 
primary caregiver without any expectation of 
compensation for the care.138 
There are a multitude of other factors many different courts 
have considered as well, including “whether a parent-child bond [has 
 
133 Id.  
134 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675; Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2593. 
135 Id.  
136 Caroline L. Kinsey, Article: Revisiting the Role of Psychological Parent in the 
Dissolution of the Homosexual Relationship, 19 BUFF. J. GENDER L. & SOC. POL’Y 75, 82 
(2011).   
137 Id. at 81-82.  
138 Id. at 82. 
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been] forged and whether [the parents] have held themselves out to the 
public generally as a single-family unit.”139  
The bond between the psychological parent and child is                
one forged over countless hours and interactions.140  These first 
attachments with the psychological parent “form the base from which 
any further relationships develop.”141  If the relationship is firmly 
maintained, that bond becomes immensely productive on both the 
intellectual and the social development of the child.142  Withdrawing 
such support, voluntarily or by court order, can have serious 
detrimental effects on the child who has that strong bond.143  In States 
that recognize the label of psychological parent, a party labeled as such 
will be provided standing to seek custody and visitation.144 
The impetus now is for the psychological parent label, and the 
legal benefits that come with that label, to be applied to homosexual 
couples.145  In the past, such a label only applied to heterosexual 
couples.146  However, it is the argument of this Note that a party not 
biologically related to the subject child would not “infringe upon the 
‘constitutional right [of legal parents] to direct the upbringing of their 
children.’”147   
1. Jurisdictional Discussion 
The lack of cohesion has led to different interpretations of the 
psychological parent doctrine from state to state.148  In S.F. v. M.D.,149 
 
139 Id. at 82.  
140 JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF 
THE CHILD 18 (The Free Press, 2nd ed. 1979).  
141 Id.  
142 Id. 
143 Id.  
144 Id.  
145 Specifically, in the context of this Note, the legal benefits of being recognized as a 
psychological parent, and the ability to have standing when seeking custody and/or visitation 
as a direct result of having that label.  
146 Kinsey, supra note 136, at 81.   
147 Id. at 85 (citation omitted).  
148 Id. at 86.  For a more robust discussion including many different states, see id. at 86-93.  
For the purpose of this Note, the author will be focusing on the northeastern states and how 
they have handled, if at all, the psychological parent doctrine. 
149 751 A.2d 9, 10 (Md. 2000).  In this case, Appellant and Appellee, a female same-sex 
couple, began living together in 1991. Id.  In 1994, Appellee was artificially inseminated and 
gave birth. Id.  The case centered on whether the Appellant had a right to visitation with the 
minor child. Id.  
17
Mahoney: The “Legal Stranger” and Parent
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018
548 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 34 
a case of first impression, Maryland’s highest court borrowed the 
Wisconsin four-prong test for determining if a psychological parent 
relationship was present.150  The four-prong test required that: 
To demonstrate the existence of the petitioner’s parent-
like relationship with the child, the petitioner must 
prove four elements: (1) that the biological or adoptive 
parent consented to, and fostered, the petitioner’s 
formation and establishment of a parent-like 
relationship with the child; (2) that the petitioner and 
the child lived together in the same household; (3) that 
the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by 
taking significant responsibility for the child’s care, 
education, and development, including contributions 
towards the child’s support, without expectation of 
financial compensation; and (4) that the petitioner has 
been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to 
have established with the child a bonded, dependent 
relationship parental in nature.151  
Using this test, Maryland held that a non-legal parent was 
entitled to standing in seeking visitation with the child.152   
In conjunction with the Maryland and Wisconsin cases, the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted the psychological parent label 
in the case V.C. v. M.J.B.153  This case identified the non-legal parent 
is a psychological parent.154  The court stated that the termination of 
the partner’s relationship did not necessarily mean that the relationship 
between the psychological parent and the child terminated as well.155  
Highlighting the fact that the legal parent fostered the non-legal 
parent’s relationship with the child, the New Jersey court shut down 
critics who believed there to be a slippery slope argument.156  
Requiring the legal parent to foster the relationship between the child 
 
150 Kinsey, supra note 136, at 87-88.  
151 Holtzman v. Knolt (In re custody of H.S.H.-K), 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995). 
152 S.F. v. M.D., 751 A.2d 9, 15, 17 (Md. 2000).  While this case did allow the petitioner to 
seek visitation, during the subsequent hearing it was found that visitation was causing 
behavioral problems with the child. When visitation stopped, so did the behavioral problems. 
Id. at 19.  
153 V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000).  
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 552. 
156 Id. 
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and the non-legal parent preserves the psychological parent title from 
part-time babysitters and visitors.157   
2. Psychological Parent in New York 
New York is known as one of the first states to severely restrict 
the rights of psychological parents.158  In 1986, the Third Department 
heard Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG.,159 in which the Petitioner and 
Respondent were both high school students who engaged in sexual 
relations without protection.160  The Respondent, however, was also 
engaged in a sexual relationship with another individual, Michael 
Walpole.161  Michael, as later blood grouping tests proved, fathered a 
child with the Respondent, but it was the Petitioner who lived 
intermittently with the Respondent and the subject child.162  The 
Family Court found that extraordinary circumstances existed, namely 
that the Respondent had “encouraged and condoned the father-son 
relationship which developed between Petitioner and (the subject 
child).”163   
These extraordinary circumstances permitted the Petitioner 
standing to seek custody of the subject child.164  The record amply 
supported the Court’s holding that the attachment formed between the 
two, even though there was no biological relation, was an 
extraordinary circumstance; thus, granting standing for Petitioner to 
seek custody and/or visitation of the child.165  The Appellate Court did 
not, however, hold that the Petitioner could exercise visitation with the 
child, only that the Petitioner had standing to petition the Court for the 
opportunity to be granted visitation.166  The Appellate Division refused 
 
157 Kinsey, supra note 136, at 90.  
158 Id. at 93.  
159 502 N.Y.S.2d 823 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986). 
160 Id. at 824.  
161 Id.  
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 825.  Some of the factors the Court looked to were the parties had lived together 
for many months during the first two years of the child’s life, the petitioner was held out as 
the child’s father, the petitioners name was listed on the birth certificate, and petitioner was 
called “daddy” by the child. Ronald FF, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 825.  There were also psychologists 
for both sides who stated that to remove petitioner from the child’s life would have a 
“wrenching affect” that should be avoided if possible. Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 825.  In this case, the Petitioner was granted visitation rights with the subject child.  
166 Ronald FF, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 825. 
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to decide, or offer dicta, on whether granting the Petitioner the right to 
visitation was in the best interest of the subject child.167  While this 
established the doctrine of psychological parent in New York, a 
question remains as to whether or not the non-legal, non-biological 
parent was actually awarded visitation with the subject-child. 
In 1987, the Appellate Division reversed a Family Court 
decision that granted the psychological parent the right to visitation.168  
In Dehar v. Dehar,169 the Family Court awarded custody of 
Christopher Dehar to Angelo Iacono, the former boyfriend of 
Christopher’s biological mother, while denying custody to the child’s 
biological father.170  Respondent mother then sought review of the 
Family Court order.171   
The Appellate Court relied on the precedent set by Ronald FF, 
concluding that “the psychological parenthood of a nonparent alone 
[does not] constitute[] extraordinary circumstance[s]. . . .”172  While 
the Court denied custody to the nonbiological parent, the Court also 
concluded that a claim made by a non-legal parent would be 
insufficient when the rights of the legal parent were undisputed.173  The 
Appellate Division also placed firm boundaries around what would 
affect the legal parents’ rights when it came to custody, stating 
exclusively that only “surrender, abandonment, unfitness, persistent 
neglect, unfortunate or involuntary extended disruption of custody, or 
other equivalent but rare extraordinary circumstance which would 
drastically affect the welfare of the child,” would be able to interfere 
with those rights.174  Again, the Appellate Court did not extend custody 
rights to a psychological parent.175  While the parents were not married, 
the fact that the Court refused to extend standing to a psychological 
 
167 Id.  
168 Dehar v. Dehar, 521 N.Y.S.2d 335, 336 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). 
169 Id. at 335.  
170 Id. at 336.  
171 Id.  
172 Id. In addition to holding that the bond of a psychological parent was not an 
extraordinary circumstance, the Appellate Division also held that the Bennett test, was 
inapplicable. Dehar, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 336.  The Bennett test guided the courts by principles 
which reflected the societal judgements regarding the family unit and parenthood when 
considering the child’s best interest. Bennett v. Jefferys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 549 (N.Y. 1976).   
173 Kinsey, supra note 136, at 94.  
174 Dehar, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 336.  
175 Id. 
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parent is of import when considering the extent of the relationship the 
would-be parent and the subject-child had.176  
As recently as 2010, New York still did not acknowledge a 
psychological parent when deciding custody.177  In Debra H. v. Janice 
R.,178 Debra bought a proceeding against Janice seeking joint legal and 
physical custody of the six-year-old boy conceived during the couple’s 
relationship.179  The New York Court of Appeals held that without a 
second-parent adoption, the petitioner had no standing to seek custody 
or visitation.180   
Citing to both Bennett and Ronald FF., the Court of Appeals 
found that the extraordinary circumstances rule does not apply to a 
“biological stranger” regardless of the fact that the couple were 
married.181  Rather than accepting evidence that displayed the 
attachment of the nonbiological parent to the child, the Court stated 
that it required adoption, which would have granted Debra legal 
standing.182  Holding firm to their bright line rule decided in Alison D., 
the New York court found that:  
The flexible type of rule championed by Debra H. 
threatens to trap the single biological and adoptive 
parents and their children in a limbo of doubt.  These 
parents could not possibly know for sure when another 
adult’s level of involvement in family life might reach 
the tipping point and jeopardize their right to bring up 
their children without the unwanted participation of a 
third party.183 
The Court ignored the fact that the biological parent 
encouraged the nonbiological parent to adopt the child, evidencing the 
biological parent’s willingness to have a relationship develop between 
the nonbiological parent and subject-child.184  The Court, thus, found 
that the nonbiological parent had no right to seek custody or visitation, 
 
176 Id.  
177 Debra H., 930 N.E.2d 184. 
178 Id.  
179 Id. at 186-87.  
180 Id. at 194. Debra H. also decided a comity issue. See discussion supra Section II, D.  
Debra and Janice entered into a civil union in Vermont while Janice was pregnant. Id. at 186.  
181 Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 190.  
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 193.  
184 Id.  
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and to give her that right would infringe on the right of the biological 
parent.185   
B. De Facto Parent 
As defined in the ALI Principles of the Law of Family 
Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 2.03(c):  
[A] de facto parent is an individual other than a legal 
parent or a parent by estoppel who, for a significant 
period of time not less than two years, (i) lived with the 
child and, (ii) for reasons primarily other than financial 
compensation, and with the agreement of a legal parent 
to form a parent-child relationship, or as a result of a 
complete failure or inability of any legal parent to 
perform caretaking functions, (A) regularly performed 
a majority of the caretaking function for the child, or 
(B) regularly performed a share of caretaking functions 
at least as great as that of the parent with whom the 
child primarily lived.186 
In Comment c. ALI notes that the law most closely 
approximating this criterion is that of Wisconsin.187  Other 
jurisdictions have defined a de facto parent in a less stringent fashion, 
with fewer requirements placed upon the parent attempting to meet this 
status of parent.188  For example, Massachusetts has defined a de facto 
parent as someone without a biological relationship, but who typically 
resides with the child and performs a share of the caretaking 
 
185 Id. at 193.  
186 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 108 (American Law Institute, 1st softcover ed. 2003).   
187 Id. at 131.  Wisconsin allows visitation (but not custody) to be awarded to an individual 
who has formed a “parent-like relationship” with a child if:  
(1) the biological or adoptive parent consented to the formation and 
establishment of a parent-like relationship, (2) the petitioner and the child 
lived together in the same household, (3) the petitioner assumed 
significant responsibility for the child’s care, education and development, 
including contributing towards the child’s support without expectation of 
financial compensation, and (4) the parental role assumed by the petition 
was for a length of time sufficient to have established a bonded, dependent 
relationship parental in nature. 
 Id.  
188 Care & Protection of Sharlene, 445 Mass. 756, 766 (Mass. 2006), (citing ALI PRINCIPLES 
OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION §2.03 (1)(b)). 
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responsibilities.189  The petitioner must be a participant in the child’s 
life as a member of the child’s family.190  
1. Other Jurisdictional Approaches to De Facto 
Parents  
Adopting a less stringent definition, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court, in Care & Protection of Sharlene,191 decided a case in 
which a child’s stepfather was seeking to be declared Sharlene’s de 
facto parent.192  During the trial court’s hearing, petitioner described 
his relationship with Sharlene over the four years he lived with her.193  
He testified that he supported her financially, attended dance recitals, 
and generally took an interest in her welfare.194  He testified that 
Sharlene, around her friends, referred to him as “her father.”195  He 
conceded that he did not perform much of Sharlene’s parenting 
functions, nor did he testify as to his knowledge of Sharlene’s injuries 
and the way they were inflicted, invoking his Fifth Amendment 
right.196   
When the child was admitted to Baystate Medical Center on 
September 11, 2005, she arrived with critical injuries and remained in 
an irreversible vegetative state until the Department of Social Services, 
who had been granted custody of Sharlene, asked the court’s 
permission to withdraw life support.197  The trial judge granted the 
 
189 Id. 
190 Id.  
191 Sharlene, 445 Mass. at 756.  
192 Id.  The Department of Social Services argued that petitioner had only been interviewed 
once as a part of a home visit, because he was not “available.” Id. at 764.  Petitioner had left 
the day before Sharlene was brought to the hospital, knowing she had been injured and was 
throwing up, but did nothing to check on her. Id.  Sharlene’s guardian ad litem also argued 
that, given the extent both physically and chronologically of Sharlene’s injuries, that petitioner 
had to know––if not a participant––of the habitual abuse of Sharlene. Id. 
193 Sharlene, 445 Mass. at 764.  
194 Id. at 763.  
195 Id.  
196 Id.  
197 Id. at 758.  On September 13, the Department of Social Services filed a care and 
protection petition and received custody of Sharlene. Sharlene, 445 Mass. at 757.  On 
September 22, Sharlene’s adoptive mother, who was her only legal guardian, died. Id.  
Sharlene’s biological mother was sixteen when she had Sharlene and was not married to 
Sharlene’s biological father. Id. at 758.  When Sharlene was four, she was sent to live with her 
aunt, who would later become her adoptive mother. Id.  That same year, after it was determined 
Sharlene was sexually abused by her biological mother’s boyfriend, the Department of Social 
Services received custody of Sharlene. Id.  She was permitted to stay at her aunt’s home as a 
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motion to withdraw life support and provided that his decision was to 
be made available only to persons connected with the case.198  Given 
the evidence presented, the trial judge found that the petitioner did not 
provide a majority of the caretaking functions of the child.199  The 
judge also concluded that, because the petitioner was not the legal, 
adoptive, putative, or de facto father of Sharlene, he would not be 
allowed to participate as a party in the hearing regarding withdrawal 
of life support.200  The petitioner then challenged the denial of his 
motion for de facto parental status, and sought a new hearing on the 
withdrawal of life support in which he, as the de facto parent, would 
have a voice.201   
After reaching the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, the Court 
affirmed the lower court’s denial of petitioner’s motion to be deemed 
Sharlene’s de facto parent.202  The Court noted:  
[A] de facto parent must live with the child for not less 
than two years and that the caretaking relationship have 
been established “for reasons primarily other than 
financial compensation, and with the agreement of a 
legal parent to form a parent-child relationship, or as a 
result of a complete failure of inability of any legal 
parent to perform caretaking functions.”203 
The Court also noted that, given the precedent set, the ties 
between a child and a de facto parent must be loving and nurturing.204  
In its holding, the Court discussed petitioners lack of evidence that 
proved his loving and nurturing relationship with Sharlene.205  
Ultimately deciding against allowing petitioner to attain de facto 
 
foster child. Sharlene, 445 Mass. at 758.  In February of 2000, petitioner began living in the 
home and married Sharlene’s aunt in September of 2001. Id.  In October 2001, Sharlene was 
adopted by her aunt as a single parent. Id.  The guardian ad litem report disclosed multiple 
instances of child abuse and investigations involving Sharlene and her two siblings. Id.  
198 Id.   
199 Sharlene, 445 Mass. at 764.   
200 Id. at 766.  
201 Id.  Petitioner also argued that the public should be allowed access to all proceedings, 
except the new hearing he was requesting, and all relevant documents. Id.  The Court, while 
questioning if petitioner had standing to bring a claim on behalf of the public, ultimately denied 
petitioner’s request to make the proceedings and documents public. Id. 
202 Sharlene, 445 Mass. at 756.  
203 Id. at 766 (quoting ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION §2.03(c)). 
204 Id. at 768. 
205 Id.  The Court had difficulty finding evidence that the relationship was even beneficial 
to the child. Id. 
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parent status, the Court held that “to recognize petitioner as a de facto 
parent . . . is unthinkable in the circumstances of this case and would 
amount to an illogical and unprincipled perversion of the doctrine.”206   
Sharlene’s case contains the important belief that in order to be 
considered a de facto parent, the would-be parent must have a loving 
relationship with the child.207  This places an important limit upon who 
may be considered a de facto parent under the law.208  While the 
petitioner may have met a definition of de facto parent, without the 
loving relationship, the best interest of the child would not be met.209  
The Massachusetts Courts have granted standing to seek custody and 
visitation to de facto parents when this factor is present.210 
Massachusetts, however, allowed de facto parents a legal right 
to custody and visitation in E.N.O. v. L.M.N..211  The parties were two 
women who were engaged in a committed and monogamous 
relationship for thirteen years.212  In 1991, they decided that the 
defendant would be artificially inseminated with their child.213  The 
plaintiff attended all insemination appointments and participated in all 
medical decisions.214  In 1994, the couple became pregnant and, 
throughout the complicated pregnancy, plaintiff took care of defendant 
and attended every doctors visit.215   
Before the child was born, and again after, the two women 
executed a co-parenting agreement, which “expressed the parties’ 
intent that the plaintiff retain her parental status even if the defendant 
and the plaintiff were to separate.”216  When the child was born, the 
plaintiff acted as a birthing coach, cut the baby’s umbilical cord, stayed 
overnight at the hospital, was given a parent hospital bracelet, was 
listed as parent on the birth announcements, and shares a last name 
with the child.217  She assumed financial responsibility of the child and 
 
206 Sharlene, 445 Mass. at 768.  
207 Id.   
208 Id.  
209 Id.  
210 Id. 
211 429 Mass. 824 (Mass. 1999). 
212 Id. at 825. 
213 Id.  Before beginning the insemination, both parties attended workshops to learn about 
the process and typical parenting issues that may arise. Id. 
214 Id.  
215 E.N.O., 429 Mass. at 825.   
216 Id.  The defendant also executed documents authorizing the plaintiff to care for the child 
as a parent.  
217 Id.   
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assumed primary care of the child when the defendant was 
experiencing medical issues.218  While engaged in adoption 
proceedings, the couple’s relationship began to deteriorate until they 
finally separated in May 1998.219  At this point, the defendant denied 
plaintiff access to the child.220  
After seeking custody and visitation, the plaintiff was awarded 
temporary visitation by a Probate Court judge.221  Upon further review 
by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, it affirmed the lower court’s 
decision.222  Considering the child’s nontraditional family, the Court 
held that:  
[T]he de facto parent resides with the child and, with 
the consent and encouragement of the legal parent, 
performs a share of caretaking functions at least as great 
as the legal parent.  The de facto parent shapes the 
child’s daily routine, addresses his developmental 
needs, disciplines the child, provides for his education 
and medical care, and serves as a moral guide.223 
The Massachusetts Court decided that given the increasing 
number of “nontraditional” families, “the best interests (of the 
children) calculus must include an examination of the child’s 
relationship with both his legal and de facto parent.”224  As such, the 
Court held unequivocally that the plaintiff was the child’s de facto 
parent.225   
 
218 Id. at 826.  
219 Id.  
220 E.N.O., 429 Mass. at 826.  In June 1998, the plaintiff sought specific performance of the 
parties’ agreement to allow the plaintiff to adopt and assume joint custody of and visitation 
with the child.  
221 Id.  
222 Id. at 834.  
223 Id. at 829 (referencing ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION §2.03(6)).  
224 Id.  
225 E.N.O., 429 Mass. at 830.  The Court reasoned that the plaintiff participated in the child’s 
life as a member of the child’s family (the child said he had two moms). Id.  The parties 
decided to have a child together and form that family; they also re-executed the co-parenting 
agreement.  Acting as parent’s to the child, and keeping the child’s best interests in mind, they 
stated their wish to continue plaintiff’s relationship with the child regardless of the status of 
the parties’ relationship. Id.  The plaintiff, with the defendant’s consent and encouragement, 
participated in the raising of the child. Id.  The child’s guardian ad litem found that the plaintiff 
was an active parent, who supported the family financially as well as emotionally.  E.N.O., 
429 Mass. at 830. The defendant furthered that relationship by representing the plaintiff as the 
child’s parent in public. Id.  The plaintiff was authorized to make medical decisions for the 
26
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The Court disagreed with the defendant’s assertions that to 
allow the plaintiff visitation was to restrict her fundamental right as a 
fit parent to the custody of her child.226  In disregarding this assertion, 
the Court balanced the defendant’s interest in protecting her custody 
right with the child’s best interest in maintaining the child’s 
relationship with the de facto parent.227  However, in that balance, the 
child’s best interests must always supersede the parents’ interests.228  
Bearing that in mind, the Massachusetts Court allowed the plaintiff, as 
a de facto parent, to have custody and visitation rights of her child.229 
2. New York’s Approach to De Facto Parents 
New York, in dealing with de facto parents, has been more 
lenient when granting custody and visitation rights to such parents.230  
The seminal case when discussing the doctrine of de facto parents in 
New York is In re Jacob.231  After the decision handed down by the 
Court of Appeals of New York in Alison D., it seemed that 
nonbiological parents would not gain custody of their children.232  
However, In re Jacob, penned by Judge Kaye who dissented in Alison 
D., held that both parents seeking custody rights to the children were 
permitted those rights.233   
In the consolidated cases of Jacob, there were favorable home 
visits, healthy and stable children, encouragement from the biological 
parent in the fostering of a parent-child relationship with the de facto 
parent, and manifestations from the children that the de facto parent 
was thought of as a traditional definition of parent.234  Judge Kaye, in 
 
child and was designated as the child’s guardian in the event of defendant’s death or inability 
to care for the child. Id.  
226 Id. at 832.  
227 Id. at 833.  The defendant’s parental rights cannot be stretched to extinguish the child’s 
relationship with the plaintiff. The defendant’s right will not be enforced to the detriment of 
the child.  
228 E.N.O., 429 Mass at 833.   
229 Id. at 834.  
230 Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397. 
231 Id. 
232 Id.  
233 Id. at 669.  As a reminder, Jacob was a combination of two cases in which proposed 
adoptive parents petitioned the family courts to adopt. Id. at 656.  One appellant petitioned to 
adopt his girlfriend’s son (with permission of the biological father). Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 656.  
The other sought adoption of the child of her lesbian partner. Id. 
234 Id. at 656-57.  
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reversing both lower court’s decisions, promoted “the statute’s 
legislative purpose––the child’s best interest.”235   
She discussed not only the economic benefits such as social 
security and life insurance benefits but also what she deems “the 
emotional security of knowing that in the event of the biological 
parent’s death or disability, the other parent will have presumptive 
custody, and the children’s relationship with their parents, siblings and 
other relatives will continue should the co-parents separate.”236  The 
Court held that denying the children the opportunity of having de facto 
parents become two legal parents would be unjust and not in the best 
interests of the children.237  The Court allowed the de facto parents to 
adopt the children of their partner, regardless of their marital status or 
sexual orientation.238 
More recently, the same Court of Appeals decided Brooke.239  
The Court returned to Justice Kaye’s dissent from Alison D., 
discussing the negative impact on the children.240  The Court discussed 
that “[a] growing body of social science reveals the trauma children 
suffer as a result of separation from a primary attachment figure––such 
as a de facto parent––regardless of that figure’s biological or adoptive 
ties to the children.”241  While making huge steps forward for 
nonbiological parents in overruling Alison D., the Court still fell short 
in establishing any kind of test for parental figures who wish to seek 
custody or visitation.242   
The Court’s guidance applies only to an exclusive group of 
couples, those who have a pre-conception agreement to conceive and 
raise children as co-parents, to have standing to seek custody and 
 
235 Id. at 658.  
236 Id. at 658-59. The Court of Appeals also found that an adoption in these cases––and 
many others––does not necessarily require a termination of biological parental rights where 
the two have agreed that the biological parent will maintain his or her rights. Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 
at 659.   
237 Id. at 667.  
238 Id. at 669.  
239 Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d 488.  This decision expressly reversed Alison D. and held “that 
where a petitioner proves by clear and convincing evidence that he or she has agreed to 
conceive and raise the child as co-parents, the petitioner has presented sufficient evidence to 
achieve standing to seek custody and visitation of the child.”  Id. at 501.  
240 Id. at 494.  “The rule of Alison D. has inflicted disproportionate hardship on the growing 
number of nontraditional families across our State.” Id. at 499.  
241 Id.  
242 Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 500.  
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visitation.243  If another parental figure comes forward seeking custody 
or visitation with such agreement, the lower courts of New York would 
have to rely on either Alison D. or In re Jacob.244  This uncertainty will 
most likely result in conflicting views of who is permitted to seek 
custody and visitation when the nonbiological parent would be 
considered a de facto parent.245  
C. Parent by Estoppel 
The advantage of adopting a parent by estoppel doctrine is that 
the child’s best interest is at the very forefront of the Court’s 
consideration of each set of circumstances.246  The best interest of the 
child is contained in the very definition of parent by estoppel.247  
According to the ALI Principles: 
[A] parent by estoppel is an individual who, though not 
a legal parent (i) is obligated to pay child support under 
Chapter 3; or (ii) lived with the child for at least two 
years and (A) over that period has a reasonable, good-
faith belief that he was the child’s biological father, 
based on marriage to the mother or on the actions or 
representations of the mother, and fully accepted 
parental responsibilities consistent with that belief, and 
(B) if some time thereafter that belief no longer existed, 
continued to make reasonable, good-faith efforts to 
accept responsibilities as the child’s father; or (iii) lived 
with the child since the child’s birth, holding out and 
accepting full and permanent responsibilities as parent, 
as part of a prior co-parenting agreement with the 
child’s legal parent (or, if there are two legal parents, 
both parents) to raise a child together each with full 
parental rights and responsibilities, when the court 
finds that recognition of the individual as a parent is in 
the child’s best interests; or (iv) lived with the child for 
at least two years, holding out and accepting full and 
permanent responsibilities as a parent, pursuant to an 
 
243 Id. at 501.  
244 Id.  
245 Id. 
246 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 186, at 107. 
247 Id. 
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agreement with the child’s parent (or, if there are two 
legal parents, both parents), when the court finds that 
recognition of the individual as a parent is in the child’s 
best interests.248 
After a co-parent meets the requirements of parent by estoppel, 
that person has the rights and privileges of a legal parent.249  These 
rights include the crucial requirement of standing to bring an action for 
custody.250  In this situation, the co-parent has gained “a presumption 
of custodial time, joint allocation of decision making, right of access 
to school and health records and priority over de facto and non-parents 
in the allocation of custody;” thus, granting the co-parents parity with 
the legal parent.251 
Most parent by estoppel cases take place in the context of 
paternity by estoppel, as illustrated by the language of the definition.252  
Estoppel considered in the area of paternity law is “applied to prevent 
a presumptive father (the husband), or the natural mother (the wife), 
from denying the husband’s paternity if the couple has resided together 
as husband and wife and the husband held the child out as his own.”253  
As such, if the mother leads the presumptive father to believe that he 
is the biological father through fraud or misrepresentation, he is not 
estopped from denying paternity, as long as, when the fraud is 
revealed, he ceases to have contact with the child.254 
1. Jurisdictional Approach to Parent by Estoppel 
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in a case of first 
impression, decided Conroy v. Rosenwald,255 which involved 
 
248 Id.  
249 Margaret S. Osborne, Legalizing Families: Solutions to Adjudicate Parentage for 
Lesbian Co-Parents, 49 VILL. L. REV. 363, 389 (2004).  
250 Id.   
251 Id.  
252 Jacqulyn A. West, Maintaining the Legal Fiction: Application of the Presumption of 
Paternity and Paternity by Estoppel in Pennsylvania, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 577, 582 (2004).  The 
continued use of “father” and “mother” in the definition lends one to belief that, at least when 
constructing §2.03(1)(b), the heterosexual family was given priority. Id.  
253 Heather Faust, Challenging the Paternity of Children Born During Wedlock: An 
Analysis of Pennsylvania Law Regarding the Effects of the Doctrines of Presumption of 
Legitimacy and Paternity by Estoppel on the Admissibility of Blood Tests to Determine 
Paternity, 100 DICK. L. REV. 963, 979 (1996).  
254 West, supra note 251, at 582.  
255 940 A.2d 409, 411 (Pa. Super. Ct., 2007). 
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estopping a father from denying paternity of his child and reinstating a 
prior child support order in favor of the mother.256  The mother had a 
relationship with Michael and a married man, Glen Rosenwald, at the 
time of conception.257  Prior to the birth of the child, and continuing 
for about two and one-half years thereafter, Michael and the mother 
lived together, although there were frequent periods of separation.258  
After some time with the mother and child, Michael claimed that he 
had DNA evidence to prove that he was not the father of the child.259  
Subsequently, the mother filed for support against Glen, who requested 
the motion be dismissed on grounds of paternity by estoppel.260  The 
lower Court refused to dismiss the petition and ordered Glen to pay 
child support.261  
On appeal, the Superior Court held that the concept of estoppel 
has been used in various cases involving paternity and support, finding 
the nature of the conduct and the effect on the father and child and their 
relationship that is the focus of such a concept.262  While considering 
the equitable remedy of paternity by estoppel, the most important 
factor the courts look to is the best interests of the child.263  Using this 
doctrine, the Court held that it was inappropriate to deny Glen’s 
request for a dismissal.264   
In examining the facts of the case, the Superior Court found 
that the mother listed Michael as the child’s father on the birth 
certificate, the mother and Michael functioned as a family unit and 
acted as the child’s parents for years, the mother instituted two actions 
against Michael for child support, and even after the mother and 
Michael ended their relationship, he continued to exercise partial 
custody of the child.265  Given these facts and the relationship 
 
256 Id.  The biological mother, Jennifer Conroy was having a sexual relationship with both 
alleged father by estoppel Michael Guinan and Appellant Glen Rosenwald. Id.  The Family 
Court found that Rosenwald was the legal father of the child as of May 21, 2001, and that 
Conroy was estopped from claiming he was the father prior to that date. Id. at 414.   
257 Id.  
258 Rosenwald, 940 A.2d at 414. 
259 Id. at 412.  
260 Id. at 413. 
261 Id.  
262 Id. at 416.  
263 Rosenwald, 940 A.2d at 419.  
264 Id.  
265 Id. at 414.  
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established between Michael and the subject-child, the Court found 
that the action instated against Glen was estopped.266  
2. New York’s Approach to Parent by Estoppel 
Historically, New York has approached parent by estoppel like 
most other States, namely, as a doctrine applicable to paternity 
cases.267  However, in the second half of 2016, Justice Abdus-Salaam 
wrote the opinion in the landmark New York Court of Appeals case, 
Brooke, which overruled Alison D. and granted standing to two parents 
seeking custody and/or visitation using the doctrine of parent by 
estoppel.268   
In the Matter of Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A. C.C. combined two 
similar appeals in which petitioners lacked any biological or adoptive 
connection to the children who were at the center of the dispute.269  The 
parties directed the attention of the Court to Alison D. and asked it to 
answer the question of whether “in an unmarried couple, a partner 
without a biological or adoptive relation to a child is [] that child’s 
‘parent’ for purposes of standing to seek custody or visitation under 
Domestic Relations Law §70. . . .”270  The Court boldly overruled 
Alison D. and held “that where a partner shows by clear and convincing 
evidence that the parties agreed to conceive a child and to raise the 
child together, the non-biological, non-adoptive partner has standing 
to seek visitation under Domestic Relations Law § 70.”271   
In the first appeal, the same-sex couple began dating in 2006, 
and soon thereafter announced their symbolic engagement.272  Then 
the couple jointly agreed to have a child together that the respondent 
would carry.273  The petitioner attended prenatal appointments, was 
involved in prenatal care, including being present in the emergency 
room when the respondent had complications related to the 
 
266 Id. at 420.  
267 See generally Arsenault, supra note 26.  
268 Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d 488.   
269 Id. at 490.  
270 Id. 
271 Id. 
272 Id.  Due to lack of financial means, the couple could not travel to another jurisdiction 
that allowed same-sex marriage.  Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 490. Also hindering the couple 
was the fact that, at this time in New York jurisprudence, the Court was unclear about whether 
it would recognize the validity of an out-of-state same-sex marriage. Id.  
273 Id. at 491.  
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pregnancy.274  Petitioner was present during labor and delivery, and 
cut the cord at birth.275  Additionally, the child was given the 
petitioner’s last name.276   
In 2010, when the parties ended their relationship, respondent 
maintained custody of the boy and allowed petitioner to have regular 
visits with the child.277  After two years of regular visitation, 
respondent and petitioner’s relationship deteriorated and by July 2013, 
petitioner’s contact with the child was effectively terminated by 
respondent.278  Petitioner then filed suit seeking joint custody and 
regular visitation.279 
The second appeal involved in this case, Estrellita A. v. 
Jennifer D.,280 involved a couple that began dating (and subsequently 
moved in together) in 2003.  In 2007, after filing for domestic 
partnership, the couple decided to have a baby with respondent 
carrying the child.281  Similar to Brooke, the petitioner attended the 
prenatal medical appointments and was called “Mama” by the baby 
girl.282  In September 2012, after ending the relationship in May 2012, 
the petitioner moved out of the home, but continued to have contact 
with the child.283  Petitioner filed suit seeking visitation with the 
child.284  When respondent sought to dismiss the petition based on lack 
 
274 Id.  
275 Id. 
276 Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 491.  The parties lived together with the child and raised his 
jointly. Id.  They shared all major parental responsibilities. Id.  For a year of the boy’s life, 
petitioner stayed home with him so that respondent could return to work. Id.  The boy called 
petitioner “Mama B.” Id.   
277 Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 491. 
278 Id.  
279 Id.  The Family Court appointed attorney found that the best interest of the child would 
be served by allowing regular visitation. Id.  Family Court dismissed the petition, claiming 
that plaintiff/petitioner did not have standing under Domestic Relations Law § 70 to seek 
custody and/or visitation with the child. Id.  Family Court noted that petitioner did not adopt 
the child and noted the constraint on it by Alison D.  The Appellate Division unanimously 
affirmed, concluding that there was no legal or biological relation to the child, Alison D. 
prohibited a ruling that petitioner had standing under Domestic Relations Law § 70. Brooke 
S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 491. 
280 Id.  
281 Id. at 491-92.  The couple also decided that the donor would be of the same ethnicity as 
the petitioner. Id. at 492.   
282 Id.  The three resided in the couple’s home while the two shared a complete range of 
parental responsibilities. Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 492. 
283 Id.  
284 Id.  In a suit pending at the same time, respondent was seeking child support from 
petitioner, who denied liability. Id.  The court appointed an attorney for the child. Id.  After a 
hearing, the Family Court granted the child support petition, holding that “‘the uncontroverted 
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of standing under Alison D., both the attorney for the child and the 
attorney for petitioner opposed.285  When hearing the petition, the 
Court held “that petitioner’s regular visitation and consultation on 
matters of import with respect to the child would serve the child’s best 
interests.”286 
Under Alison D., the Court had held that the word parent in 
DRL § 70 should be interpreted narrowly, precluding standing “for a 
de facto parent who, under a theory of equitable estoppel, might 
otherwise be recognized as the child’s parent for visitation 
purposes.”287  The Brooke Court criticized its predecessors, stating 
that, “[d]eparting from [the] tradition of invoking equity, in Alison D., 
we narrowly defined the term ‘parent,’ thereby foreclosing ‘all inquiry 
into the child’s best interest’ in custody and visitation cases involving 
parental figures who lacked biological or adoptive ties to the child.”288  
As a result, the Court found itself in a legal landscape that prevented a 
non-biological, non-adoptive parent from disclaiming parentage and 
required to pay child support, all while being denied standing to seek 
custody and visitation.289   
In light of the enactment of same-sex marriage in New York, 
and given the holding of Obergefell, Alison D.’s premise of 
heterosexual parenting and nonrecognition of same-sex couples 
became unsustainable.290  However, the fundamental right of a 
biological or legal parent mandates caution when expanding the 
definition of parent.291  These fundamental rights of parents must be 
balanced against the fundamental liberty interests of children in 
preserving the bonds they have created with their family.292   
 
facts establish[ed]’ that petitioner was ‘a parent’ to the child, and as such, ‘chargeable with the 
support of the child.’” Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 492.  Petitioner then amended her visitation 
petition to show that she had been found to be the parent and was also a legal parent when it 
came to her visitation rights. Id.   
285 Id.  The Family Court denied the motion to dismiss. Id.  It opined that, while petitioner 
did not have standing under Alison D. nor Debra H., given respondent’s successful support 
petition, equitable estoppel applied in this case. Id. 
286 Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 493.  
287 Id. at 494.  
288 Id. at 498 (quoting Alison D., 77 N.Y.2d at 659 (Kaye, J., dissenting)).  
289 Id.  
290 Id.  
291 Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 499.  
292 Id.  
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The Court struggled with devising a test when considering who 
has standing as a parent under DRL § 70.293  It held that because of the 
fundamental rights afforded to biological and legal parents, any test 
that seeks to expand the definition of parent must be appropriately 
narrow.294  Petitioners and some amici encouraged the Court to endorse 
a functional test for standing, which considers many factors, most 
relating to the post-birth relationship between the non-biological, non-
adoptive parent and the child.295  Others proposed a “test that hinges 
on whether petitioner can prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
a couple ‘jointly planned and explicitly agreed to the conception of a 
child with the intention of raising the child as co-parents.’”296   
The Court, however, rejected the premise that it must decide a 
test that would be appropriate for all situations, but rather finds that 
because the two cases involve couples that have entered a pre-
conception agreement, that agreement is enough to establish 
standing.297  As such, while Brooke expressly overruled Alison D., 
making significant progress in the field of same-sex couples by giving 
them standing to seek custody and visitation, it fell short of securing 
them such standing in all situations.298  Without a pre-conception 
agreement, the Court is silent on whether a non-biological, non-
adoptive parent would have standing under the “broadened” definition 
of parent under DRL § 70.299 
V. ANALYSIS 
Under the psychological parent doctrine, the person seeking 
custody or visitation must not be the legal parent, must have resided 
with the child for a specified amount of time, and must have routinely 
performed a certain share of caretaking functions.300  If this was the 
test used in Brooke, both petitioners would have been awarded 
standing.301  Both petitioners were not the legal parents, both lived with 
 
293 Id. at 500. 
294 Id.  
295 Id.  
296 Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 500.  
297 Id.  All parties entered into a pre-conception agreement to conceive and raise their child 
as co-parents. Id. 
298 Id. at 501.  
299 Id. 
300 See discussion supra Section IV.  
301 See generally Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d 488.  
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the respondent and child for a significant period of time allowing for a 
close parent-child bond to be formed, and both shared major parenting 
responsibilities.302 Basing the relationship on the day-to-day 
interaction, companionship and shared experiences of the adult and 
child helps to ensure third-parties that are too far removed do not 
infringe on the biological or legal parents fundamental rights.303  Under 
this concept, a same-sex former partner would have standing to seek 
custody and visitation only if there was a significant tie to the child and 
if the above requirements had been met.  
The concept of a de facto parent allows for a non-legal, non-
biological parent to have standing to seek custody and visitation.304  It 
requires the person to have lived with the child for at least two years, 
or since birth if the child is not yet two, and have regularly performed 
caretaking functions for the child.305  In the consolidated case of 
Brooke, both petitioners would again meet the criteria required to have 
standing.306  Both women lived with the child for at least two years or 
since birth and regularly performed caretaking functions, which began 
with prenatal doctor visits.307  This concept would again prevent far-
removed third parties from seeking custody and visitation while 
infringing on the fundamental rights of biological or legal parents.308 
The final principle that could establish standing for custody and 
visitation is parent by estoppel.309  Typically utilized in paternity cases, 
this concept could also be used for same-sex parents seeking custody 
and visitation.310  The parent by estoppel doctrine states that a person 
who is obligated to pay child support or a person who has lived with 
the child for two years, while having a reasonable, good-faith that he 
or she is the biological parent, or held the child out to be his or her own 
is considered to have standing when seeking custody or visitation.311  
Again, in the case of Brooke, both petitioners would have satisfied the 
doctrine of parent by estoppel.312  Both lived with the child since birth, 
 
302 Id. at 490-93.  
303 Goldstein et.al, supra note 140, at 19.  
304 See discussion supra Section IV.  
305 See discussion supra Section IV.  
306 See generally Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d 488. 
307 Id. at 490-93. 
308 See discussion supra Section IV.  
309 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 186, at 107-08.  
310 See discussion supra Section IV.  
311 See discussion supra Section IV.  
312 See generally Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d 488. 
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held out and accepted the child as their own, and accepted full and 
permanent responsibilities as parents.313  
VI. CONCLUSION  
In refusing to establish a bright-line test when considering 
standing in a custody and visitation petition put forth by a same-sex 
former partner, the Court has left the nonbiological and non-legal 
parents of New York in a state of confusion and without an easy to 
navigate roadmap.314  The holding of Brooke did, however, allow a 
small group of nonbiological, non-legal parents to have standing to 
seek custody and/or visitation––those with a pre-conception 
agreement.315  It is the position of this Note that the Court of Appeals 
of New York should expand the legal definition of a parent when the 
Court meets a “legal stranger” who is not a legal or biological parent, 
but meets the definitions set forth in the ALI Principles of 
psychological parent, de facto parent, and parent by estoppel.316  
Respectively, the courts should recognize the bond fused between the 
would-be parent and child, and allow the would-be parent to have 
standing to seek custody and/or visitation. 
The three proposed doctrines of psychological parent, de facto 
parent, and parent by estoppel offer an established way for the courts 
to decide who has standing with regard to custody and visitation.317  In 
providing a clear, well-established test, the Court of Appeals could 
have prevented what is sure to be an onslaught of cases where there is 
no pre-conception agreement between same-sex partners.  Having this 
unanswered question will likely to lead to differing standards and a 
lack of consensus among lower New York courts. As such, the stability 
and permanence that is fundamental to a child’s development will be 
in jeopardy until the Court adopts a broader test to establish 
standing.318   
 
313 Id. 490-93.  
314 Id. at 501.  
315 Id.  
316 See generally discussion supra Section IV.  
317 See discussion supra Section IV.  
318 See Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d 488; Alison D., 572 N.E.2d 27.  Compare the holding in 
Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 490, with Justice Kaye’s dissent in Alison D, 572 N.E.2d. at 30-33. 
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